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Thinking Outside the Box .. 
Arabs and Race in the United States 
LOUISE CAINKAR 
ARABS HAVE HAD A UNIQUE EXP E RIEN CE with race in America. In their 
one-hundred-plus-year history in the United States, their social status has 
changed from marginal white status to a more subordinate status that shares 
many features common to the experiences of people of color. Just as one can 
document and measu_re the process of becoming white (Omi and Winant 1994; 
Roediger 1991) a downgrading of the social status of Arabs in the United States 
through racial formation processes is measurable in public policies; in main-
stream representations; in social patterns of discrimination, separation, and 
exclusion; and in self-identification. Althoug~ the early Arab American expe-
rience (1880-1930) was largely similar t_o that of white ethnics as measured 
by structural rights, such as land ownership, employment, voting, and natu-
ralization (although there are some localized exceptions; see Cainkar forth-
coming), and social pa~terns, such as freedom of movement and residential 
and marital commingling among whites, the Arab American experience since 
the late 1960s has been decidedly different. After that point in time, dominant 
themes of the Arab American experience have been exclusion, prejudice, dis- . . 
crimination, stereotyping; and selective policy enforcement, themes evidenced 
in scholarly research produced during this period (e.g. , Suleiman 1999; McCa-
rus 1994; Suleiman and Abu-Laban 1989; Cainkar 1988; Shaheen 1984, 2001; 
Abraham and Abraham.1983; Bassiouni 1974; Hagopian and Paden 1969). In-
deed, the most important pan-Arab American organizations founded since the 
1960s-the Association of Arab American University Graduates, the American 
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), the Arab American Institute, 
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and the National Association of Arab Americans-had reversing these condi-
tions and dismantling the propositions of innate cultural difference that lay at 
their root as primary organizational objectives. One of the first historic studies 
of Arab American communities commissioned by an Arab American organiza-
tion noted: 
At a time when the United States is more receptive to cultural pluralism, and 
ethnicity is no longer socially unacceptable, Arab Americans remain primary 
targets of defamatory attacks on their cultural and personal character. Thus, 
much of the activity of the Arab-American community has been directed at 
correcting the stereotypes that threaten to produce a new wave of anti-Arab 
racism in the United States and endanger the civil and human rights 9f the 
Arab-Amerkan com_rnunity. (Zogby 1984, 21) · 
The racialization processes experienced by Arab Americans differ in both 
histor~cal timing and pretext from that of other groups in the United States. His-
torically afforded some of the benefits and protections of whiteness, such as in 
their eligibility for homestead lands and legal and voting rights, the exclusion 
of Arab Americans from social and political perquisites postdates the historic 
exclusions of other negatively racialized groups. It cannot therefore be perfectly 
tied, in its· genesis, to ideas about race and the superiority of whiteness that have 
existed since th~ founding of the United States. Rather, the fall of Arabs from the 
graces of marginal whiteness is traceable to the emergence of the United States as 
a global superpower. This sociopolitical relationship, although not framed in ra-
cial terms, is acknowledged in some of the earlier scholarship on Arab Americans. 
For example, Suleiman and Abu-Laban note that the source of bias a·gainst Arabs 
in the United States relates "more to the original homeland and peoples than 
to the Arab-American community" (1989, 5), nonetheless producing substantial 
negative domestic repercussions. In the 1984 Zogby report noted above, domestic 
"images of greedy oil sheiks and bloodthirsty terrorists" are tied to political and 
economic events in the Middle East. More to the point, Fay states that "the source 
of today's defamation of Arab-Americans might be described as the domestic 
counterpart of the Arab-Israeli conflict" ( 1984; 22). My research on Palestinians 
in the United States (Cainkar 1988) showed how adopting an American iden-
tity was fraught with conflict for Palestinian Americans, who were portrayed by 
the media as a culturally barbaric group and treated by the U.S. government as 
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the enemy within. How can one be American and America's enemy at the same 
time? The Palestinian case exposed the racialized nature of the challenge: the 
Soviet, Cuban, and Sandinista enemies were about governments and ideologies, 
the Arab enemy was about innate cultural dispositions to violence, 
The domestic transformation of Arabs from marginal white to subordinate 
status was facilitated by the flexibility of whiteness and the histo.ric and "ob-
servable" racial liminality of Arabs (a concept that can be extended to South 
Asians). In the decades prior to 1920, Arab whiteness was contested by local 
court clerks and judges trying to block their naturalization in locations such as 
Detroit, Buffalo, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and parts of the South ( e.g., Georgia and 
South Carolina) (Samhan 1999). These experie_nces, however, were neither uni-
versal nor indicative of the totality of the early Arab American experience and 
can be counterposed, for example, by the freedom of movement experienced by 
: Arabs engaged in commerce. These disparate experiences highlight the notion 
that race is socially constructed and that racial projects are embedded in local 
social relationships (Gualtieri 2004). But at its core, the social exclusion of Araps 
in the United States has been a racial project because Arab inferiority has been 
· constructed and sold to the American public using essentialist constructions of 
human difference. In the 1990s, when Islamist challenges to American global he-
gemony became more powerful than Arab nationalism, these constructions were 
extended to Muslims ~nd became grander; they became civilizational. Seen as 
recently as 1943 as pe_rsons who shared "in the development of our civilization" 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), affirming their white-
ness and justifying their eligibility for naturalization, by the 1990s the "clash of 
civilizations" view (Huntington 1996), positioning Arabs (and Muslims) as the 
cultural Other, had become an accepted scholarly perspective. The seemingly 
race-neutral lens of essentialized cultural and religious differences was evoked 
after blatant racism had lost its power as an effective hegemonic tool (a conse-
quence of the civil rights movemen to some critical race theorists). 
Nonetheless, all the o ents of a racial project ere there: the assertion of 
innate characteristics held by all members o a group. Power then comes into play 
when positive or negative valence is attached to innate characteristics and domi-
nant societal instituti~ns are utilized to inform, reward, control, and punish 
based on these determinations. Because race remains one of the fundamental 
tools for claiming rewards and organizing discipline in American society, and is 
something Americans know and understand, these notions of essential human 
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difference have been corporealized, as if they were about color. Thus, race be-
came the operant reference category for a woman opposing the construction of 
a mosque in her suburb when she testified: "I have no ill remorse for the Muslim 
race at all. I wish we could all live in peace, but . .. "1 The corporealization is also 
evident in the actionable but sloppy phenotypic category "Arabs, Muslims, and 
persons assumed to be Arabs and Muslims," terms without which one cannot 
accurately describe hate incidents in the United States after the 9/11 attacks. 
The racialization of Arabs is thus tied to larger global policies of the U.S. 
government. The domestic aspect of this project is in the manufacture of public 
consent-needed to support, finance, and defend these policies. For this reason, 
the most noted features of Arab exclusion in the United States are tactical: per-
sistent, negative media representations; denial of political voice; governmental 
and nongovernmental policies targeting activism; and distortions of Arab and 
Muslim values, ways of life, and homelands ("civilizational" distortions). All of 
these actions are tied to the disenfranchisement of dissenting voices and dele-
gitim~tion of Arab claims so as to assert information hegemony. 
Since the darkening of Arabs began in earnest after the beneficiaries of the 
U.S. civil rights movement had been determined and the categories of "non-
white" and "minority" had been set, Arabs have experienced the double burden 
of being excluded from whiteness and from mainstream recognition as people 
of color. They are still officially white and ineligible for affirmative action (Sam-
han 1999). This.exclusion also has been evident in political mobilizations and in 
- multicultural pedagogy. Political exclusion of Arab voices has been reinforced in 
mainstream civil society institutions by issue control, through which organiza-
tional leadership silences discussion of issues that challenge U.S. policies in the 
Arab world if their assertion is deemed to hinder other organizational objectives. 
In pedagogy, Arabs have been excluded from race and ethnic studies, and when 
mentioned, often·treated differently than other groups (Cainkar 2002b). Con-
sider the following quote from a race and ethnic studies textbook that implies 
that unlike other groups, Arabs are responsible for their own stereotyping: 
Perhaps more serious (than discrimination faced by Muslim women) is the 
persistence of negative stereotyping that has plagued Middle Easterners in the 
US. The activities .of Arab terrorists in the ME and elsewhere have created a 
1. Field notes, Orland Park, Illinois, mosque hearing, Apr. 2004. 
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50 Louise Calnkar 
sinister image of Arab and other Middle Eastern groups-· an image that was · 
greatly exacerbated by the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. (Empha-
sis added) (Marger 2003, 165) 
The isolation of Arab Americans and their organizations from mainstream 
vehicles of dissent left them with few powerful allies from the 1960s onward (al-
though they have had some local successes), allowing their challenges to hostile 
media representations, textbook biases, and selective policy enforcement to be 
ignored without a price. 2 Perpetuation and reinforcement of stigmatized views 
and political isolation of Arab Americans left them open targets for collective 
punishment after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. 
Because the formation of Arabs as a unique racial group (separate from 
whites as well as others) was a racial project with timing and-purpose different 
from historic American racism, its objective manifestation also differs from that 
of traditionally subordinated groups: African American, Latinos, Asians, and 
Native Americans. Its impact is not well measured by indexes of income, occ4-
pation, education, and residential segregation because the racialization project 
·intervened in the ongoing trajectories of historically successful Arab American 
communities and because a large percentage of post-World War II Arab immi-
grants arrived in the United States with significant amounts of human capital. 
These facts have allowed Arabs to overcome some of the economic outcomes 
that usually correlate subordinate status; at the same time, they mask deep im-
pacts on Arab American communities with low levels of human capital. 
For similar historic reasons, some Arabs may see themselves as white (espe-
cially 1_f they have benefited or seek to benefit from histori<;al whiteness) while 
others may not, and Arab American communities may vary in their political 
alliances and understandings around race. Arab Americans may have racial op-
tions (a variation of Waters's [1990] concept of ethnic options) that members 
of other groups do not possess, but these options do not alter their grounded 
.. 
realities as a negatively stigmatized group. For these reasons of experience and 
aspiration, a person's racial identity may change over the course of his/her life-
time. Racialization and racial identity formation should be seen as unfolding 
and ongoing processes for Arab Americans. · 
2. See Fay (1984, 23), where she discusses the isolation of Arab Americans and ADC's efforts 
to establish ties to other ethnic and racial groups to forge antiracist alliances. 
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The ways in. which Arabs, Muslims, and persons assumed to be Arabs and 
Muslims were held collectively responsible after the 9/11 attacks should alone 
provide convincing evidence that their racial denouement had been sufficiently 
sealed before the attacks occurred.3 The public attribution of collective respon-
sibility required an understanding that collective status trumps the individual. 
This phenomenon is r.eserved for persons from cultures represented as back-
ward or barbaric, where persons operate in Durkheimian mechanical solidarity 
"in so far as they have no action of their own, as with the molecules of inorganic 
bodies .... In societies where this type of solidarity is highly developed, the 
individual is not his own master" (Giddens 1972, 139). Allegations of primitive 
culture correspond to .Western racism as they have historically been used to 
describe communities of color. Inherently lazy, violent, familialistic, and un-
assirp.ilable groups hav:e been held responsible for their own bad fates, not the 
structure that denied them rights, as they were seen to block progress in the 
name of manifest destiny and the white man's burden. In contrast, a primary 
correlate of whiteness is the attribution of modernity, rationality, and indi-
viduality, including individual culpability. When someone who is white does 
something interpreted as wrong or reprehensible, it is depicted by the organs of 
power as an individual act, one that has no reflection on the values and beliefs 
of other members of the group. On the other hand, the virtues of whiteness that 
are positive are presented as shared characteristics. Thus, during World War 
II, Japanese in_ the United States were interred as potential enemies, but nei-
ther Germans nor Italians were so treated. Hitler, Mussolini, and their agents 
are portrayed as deviants and outliers, not reflections on white, European, or 
~hristian cultu.re. But the violent act of any Arab or Muslim is rendered to 
represent entire societies and cultures and is portrayed as a mechanical, civili-
zational act. These racialized ways of thinking require a priori stigmatization 
and cultural constructions. 
Widespread acceptance and use of the·"clash of civilizations" thesis by schol-
ars, filmmakers; publishers, the media, the Christian right, and certain mem-
bers of the U.S. government cemented the racialization of Arabs and Muslims 
and established the preconditions for collective backlash after 9/11. Because the 
3. I am speaking domestically here, but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and other features 
of the·war on terror (Guantanamo, torture; renditioning, disappearances) suggest that a global 
collective responsibility has been imposed. 
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majority of backlash has been perpetrated by whites, the backlash can be viewed 
as actions defining the boundaries of whiteness (Cainkar 2004a). Research 
conducted in Chicago shows that those who perpetrate these acts are often si-
multaneously displaying American flags, suggesting that these acts can also be 
viewed as symbolic attempts to define the boundaries of the nat10n, and who 
lies outside of it. While there is no doubt that concerns about personal safety 
and national security were behind some of the backlash and government poli-
cies that followed the 9/11 attacks, it is in their unbridled collective nature, their 
inclination to target anyone who appeared to be part of the group, that makes 
these responses racialized. Only members of groups that have been "othered" 
experience collective discipline and punishment, irrespective of any individual's 
relationship to a particular event, activity, or location. 
The remainder of this chapter presents data collected in an ethnographic 
:study of the impact of 9/11 on Arabs and Muslims in the Chicago metro area.4 
It amply demonstrates the imposition of collective guilt on Arabs and Muslims 
through public policies and popular actions, an outcome (not a beginning) of 
their racialization. It also demonstrates an achievement of the racialization proj-
_ect by showing that a majority of Arabs interviewed in the study do not think 
Arabs are white, although they are officially considered so, and know which box 
they are expected to check on forms. The various reas_ons Arabs give for this 
determination support a racialization thesis. 
Arabs and Muslims in the Uniteq States have experienced, and continue 
to experience, collective punishment for the 9/11 attacks, irrespective of the 
fact that they did not perpetrate them. Their looks and names mark them as 
targets. At the same time, because "whiteness" bears the privilege of individual 
culpability, negative actions such as the abuse of Iraqi, Afghani, or other Arab 
or-Muslim prisoners are represented as the work of lone "bad apples," thereby 
effectively circumventing the implication of higher-ups and the system they 
represent or an examination of the roots of these actions in cultivated racial-
ized hatreds and essentialized, civilizational discourses. Applause-generating · 
statements such as the following can be made by high-level military command-
ers without fear of discipline: 
4. The Russell Sage Foundation funded the study of the impact of9/11 on Arab Muslims in 
metropolitan Chicago. 
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Actually, it's a lot of fun to fight. You know, it's a hell of a hoot. I like brawling. 
You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years 
because they didn't wear a veil. You know guys like that ain't got no manhood 
left anyway. So it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them. (Lt. Gen. James Mattis, 
quoted in NBCSanDiego.com 2005) 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AFTER 9/11 
The United States government implemented a range of domestic policies in the 
name of national security and the war on terrorism after the attacks of Septem-
ber 11. Most of them were designed and carried out by the executive branch of 
government, bypassing public discussion or debate. Twenty-five of the thirty-
seven known go_vernment security initiatives implemented between September 
12, iOOl, and mid-2003 either explicitly or implicitly targeted U.S. Arabs and 
Muslims (Tsao and Gutierrez 2003). These measures included mass arrests, 
secret and indefinite detentions, prolonged detention of "material witnesses," 
closed heari~gs, secret evidence, government eavesdropping on attorney-client 
conversations, FBI interviews, wiretapping, seizures of property, removals of 
aliens with technical visa violations, and mandatory special registration. At 
· the very minimum, at least one hundred thousand Arabs and Muslims living 
in the Uqited States personally experienced one of these measures.5 Further-
more, the number of Arabs and Muslims able to study, work, and attend train-
ing, meetings, and conferences in the United States has plummeted (Cainkar 
2094a). The profiling of Arabs and Muslims at U.S. airports, via special security 
checks -and . removal from airplanes, damp~ned their desire to travel domesti-
cally or abroad.' A February 2002 article in Arab-American Busin~ss magazine 
provided special safety tips for Arab American travelers in a sidebar entitled 
"Flying While Ai:ab." While many Arabs say these selective airport procedures 
have ended, others remain reluctant to fly. 6 
5. Some 83,000 persons living in the United States underwent call-in special registration, ac-
cording to the Department of Homeland Security. At minimum, at least 20,000 additional Arabs 
and Muslims nationwide have been affected by one or more of the numerous post-9/11 national 
security initiatives. 
' 6. Interview data from the stuqy of the impact of 9/11 on Arab Muslims in metropolitan 
Chicago funded by the Russell Sage Foundation. 
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Government measures began with the roundup and dete_ntion of some 
twelve hundred citizens and noncitizens, most of Middle Eastern descent, di-
rectly after the September 11 attacks. While their names have not been revealed, 
the conditions under which persons were arrested and detained indicate profil-
ing based on looks, names, and being in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
More than five hundred of these detainees were deported for vis~ violations, 
after long incarcerations waiting for security clearance; none was charged with 
connections to terrorism. (U.S. Department of Justice 2004). Subsequent mea-
sures included mandatory holds on all nonimmigrant visa applications submit-
ted by men aged eighteen through forty-five from twenty-six countries, most 
of them Arab, subject to specia·l security clearances; interviews with some five 
thousand individuals who came to the United States from Arab and Muslim 
countries after January 1, 2000, on nonimmigrant visas; and .a second round of 
:interviews with an additional three thousand persons. The Justice Department 
asked local police departments to participate in interviewing Arab residents of 
their towns, placing them in the position of monitoring persons they are sup-
posed to protect. 
In January 2002, the !NS (now a division of the Department of Homeland 
Security) launched an initiative to track .down and deport six thousand non-
citizen males from (unnamed) Middle Eastern countries who had been ordered 
deported but had never left the United States. Although they are less than 2 
percent of the estimated 314,000 so-called "absconders" in the United States, 
Middle Easterners were the government's target. In a meeting with members 
of Chicago's Arab American community, government officials claimed that 
they were not engaging in racial profiling, as other communities would be ap-
proached next.7 They never were. In June 2002 the Department of Justice issued 
an· internal memo to the INS and U.S. Customs requesting that they seek out 
and search all Yemenis, including American citizens, entering the United States. 
Yemeni Americans were removed from planes and boarding lines, waiting hours 
for security clearances. In July 2002, the INS announced that it would begin 
enforcing section 265 (a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which re-
quires ·all aliens to register change_s of address within ten days of moving. There 
7. Statement made by U.S. Attorney Fitzpatrick at a public meeting with Chicago region 
federal government officials and members of Chicago's Arab and Muslim community. Burbank, 
Ill., Mar. 2002. 
. , 
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is nothing to prevent the selective enforcement of this rule. In fact, in one region, 
an INS official openly stated that this rule was not intended to be enforced for 
everyone.8 In North Carolina, a Palestinian legal immigrant stopped for driving 
four miles over the speed limit was detained for two months and finally charged 
with a misdemeanor for failing to report his address change. The INS sought his 
deportation. A local immigration judge later ruled that he could not be deported 
for this technical infraction because he did not willfully break the law. 
On August 12, 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft announced the implemen-
tation of the special registration prog.ram requiring tens of thousands of foreign 
visitors from Arab and Muslim countries to be fingerprinted, photographed, 
and registered. The domestic call-in part ofthe program required nonimmi-
grant males aged sixteen to sixty-four from twenty-three Muslim-majority 
countries, plus heavily Muslim Eritrea (and North Korea) to report and reg-
ister with the U.S. im~igration authorities during a specified time frame, be 
fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned, and thereafter submit to routine 
reporting.9 Credit cards, licenses, and other documents were photocopied and 
sometimes n~t returned. Registrants were checked against lists for terrorist con-
nections. Persons cleared of terrorist connections but found to be in violation of 
their visas or out of (immigration) status were jailed, required to post bond, and 
· issued removal orders (deportation). 
The INS produced flyers to advertise the call-in program. "This notice is for 
you" was splayed across the top, reminiscent of the notices posted for Japanese 
living in the western United States during World War II. The arrest and deten-
ti~n of hundreds of registrants, mostly Iranians, in southern California during 
the first period of special registration sparked national protest, as persons seek-
ing to comply voluntarily with government rules were handcuffed and led off 
to jail for visa violations. Some reported verbal abuse and body-cavity searches. 
Men were confined to rooms holding fifty or more people, in leg s_hackles, and 
8. National Immigration Forum national conference call, Aug. 15, 2002. Participation at the 
offices of the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. 
9. "Non immigrant aliens" includes all immigrants who are inspected by the INS upon entry 
to the United States and are not U.S. citizens, perm_anent residents, applicants for permanent 
residency, or applicants for asylum. The rule for special registration excluded nonimmigrants 
who· are diplomats, persons workin~ with international organizations, and a few other narrow 
categories of nonimmigrants ( categories A and G ). 
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forced to sleep on concrete floors.Io Most of these detainees were working tax-
payers with families who had otherwise lived lawfully in the United States for 
decades. Many had pending applications for permanent residency. Eventually, 
most of the detainees were released on bail, but the INS started removal pro-
. ceedings at the same time. As a result of this initial handling of special regis-: 
trants, the INS allowed persons found out of status, but cleared of terrorism, to 
post bail until their removal hearing. 
The domestic call-in part of the program ran for nine months. In May 2003, 
after stating for months that the program was not targeting certain groups be-
cause it would eventually be expanded to all visiting aliens, the government an-
nounced its phasing out. According to the Department of Homeland Security, 
82,880 Arabs, Muslims, and others from the selected countries had been "spe-
cially" registered through domestic call-in. Of these, 13,434 were issued removal 
orders for visa violations, all of them affirmatively cleared of terrorism or terror-
ist connections.II Another 127,694 persons were registered at their port of entry; 
none were found to have connections to terrorists. Of the more than 200,000 
Muslims, Arabs, and persons from Muslim-majority countries registered, less 
than 50 were found to have criminal records. The rounding up for removal of 
more than 14,000 persons 'for visa violations-a highly select group compris-
ing less than 1 percent of the estimated 3.2 to 3.6 million persons living in the 
United States while "out of status" and the 8 million undocumented-has few 
historic precedents in the United States. It far outnumbers the 556 foreign nation-
als deported for their political beliefs dm:ing the infamous 1919 Palmer Raids, but 
modestly compares to the 3.8 million Mexicans ·deported during Operation Wet-
back in the 1950s (Gourevitch 2003). The purpose of special registration, accord-
ing to the executive associate commissioner of the Office of Field Operations of 
the INS; was to facilitate the "monitoring" of aliens whose residence in the United 
States warranted it "in the interest of nat~onal security" (U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service n.d.). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2003), 
which took over immigration functions from the now-defunct INS, referred to 
special registration ( using its NSEERS acronym) as a "pilot project focusing on 
a smaller segment of the nonimmigrant alien population deemed to be of risk 
10. Reuters, Dec. 18, 2002. 
11. Carol Hallstrom (Department of Homeland Security, Community Relations), in per-
sonal communication with the author, Chicago, June 2004. 
':iia-
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to national security." .These statements make explicit the government's view that 
Arabs and Muslims as a group are considered a security risk for the United States. 
This view is found in other Bush administration programs, such as FBI director 
. Mueller's January 2003 initiative to tie FBI field office goals for wire-tapping and 
undercover activities to the number of mosques in the field area. 12 
An examination of the legislative history upon which Attorney General 
Ashcroft legitimated special registration provides useful clues about its ideologi-
cal and racial boundary making. Ashcroft cited legislative authority for this pro-
gram that encompasses a history going back to the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, 
which were primarily aimed at restraining and deporting aliens living in the 
United States who were considered subversive. Ashcroft specifically cites as his 
authority the 1940 Smith Act, which was passed to strengthen national defense 
against communist and · anarchist influences in the United States. The Smith 
Act was not aimed only at foreigners. It also prohibited American citizens from 
advocating or belonging ·to groups that advocated or taught the "duty, necessity 
desirability, or propriety" of overthrowing any level of government by "force 
or violence." It was the first peacetime federal sedition law since 1798 and was 
the basis for la_ter prosecutions of persons alleged to be meml;>ers of communist 
and socialist parties. The 2002 special registration program thus lies within the 
family of policies permitting the government to monitor, restrain, and remove 
persons whose political beliefs and ideologies it perceives as a threat. 
On the. other hand, because the special registration program named its tar-
gets by their countries of birth, not their beliefs, it shares features of the family 
.of U.S. policies based on ideas about race (beginning with slavery, abolished 
in 1865, and Indian removal), such as the 1790 Naturalization Law, denying 
naturalized citizenship to nonwhites, repealed in 1952; the 1882 Chinese Ex-
clusion Act, repealed in 1943; the Asia Barred Zone; and immigrat.ion quotas, 
enacted in 1921, revised in 1924 and 1952, and abolished in 1965, signaling the 
end of an era in which U.S. immigration policies were based principally on 
race. Although. most of these laws referred .to geographies and countries, their 
explicit purpose was racial. After 1965, it was considered against liberal dem.o-
cratic principles to discriminate blatantly in immigration policies by country 
of birth. But in 1981 the regulation of persons from certain "foreign states" 
12. See, for example, Jsikoff (2003). For a list of some of the earl ier programs, see Louise 
Cainkar (2002a). 
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reemerged in immigration law when the attorney general was permitted to re-
quire "natives of any one or more foreign states, or any class of group thereof" 
to provide the government with address and other information upon ten days' 
notice. Interestingly, the Iran crisis of 1980 was specifically mentioned in the 
House Judiciary Committee report submitted for the 1981 law, thus connecting 
two reemergences: geographically based immigration procedures and political 
Islam (U.S. House Judiciary Committee 1981). Attorney General Ashcroft used 
this law to authorize call-in special registration.'3 Selective policies by country of 
birth emerged again in 1991 when Attorney General Dick Thornburgh required 
the special registration of persons holding Iraqi and Kuwaiti passports and travel 
documents. In sum, since the end of quotas and the dawn of the civil rights era, 
punitive or controlling special immigration policies based on country of birth 
or nationality have been applied solely to Arabs and persons from (non-Euro-
pean) Muslim-majority countries (with the exception of North Korea) . These 
place-based discriminatory policies flourish at the nexus of assumptions about 
the relationship between "race" or national origin and culture and ideology. As 
they locate Arabs and Muslims and place them in subordin_ate status through 
: laws and policies specially geared for them, they reinforce the appropriateness of 
maintaining essentialist ideas about members of these groups. 
These programs link to the racialization of Arabs and Muslims because 
they give concrete meaning to essentialized, undifferentiated representations 
• of Arabs and Muslims. The discourse of security risk and assumptions about 
the innate characteristics of persons who inhabit the grand categories of Ar~b 
and Muslim are institutionalized through homeland security and war-on-terror 
policies. These discipline and control programs tied to dominant institutions 
in American society establish boundaries of the nation inside the nation, effec-
tively removing whole populations from legal protection. Operating in tandem 
with anti-Muslim discourses found throughout American society, these poli-
cies entrench the criminalization of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. 
Understanding that race is a historically located social construct that has no 
fixed meaning, that it differentiates between human beings using discourses of 
human essences, and that a racial project is one that creates or reproduces struc-
tures of domination based on these categories and understandings, we must ask: 
Can policies that target persons from two continents, three world regions, and 
13. U.S. Public Law 97-116. 
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through their messiness incorporate persons from three major religions, be con-
sidered racist and part of a racialization project?14 The answer, I believe, is yes, 
because the targets of these policies are categories of humans constructed on 
the basis of essentialized understandings. Implementation of these policies pro-
duces structural outcomes of inequality and further entrenches popular notions 
of a "terrorist" phenotype. This global project that includes multiple subordi-
nate populations has been amalgamated into a civilizational racial project. 
POP U L A R SUP P O RT FOR CO LL ECT IV E POLI C I ES 
After the 9/11 attacks, public opinion polls showed broad support for the special 
treatment of Arabs, as a group, in the United States. A poll conducted in mid-
September 2001 found respondents evenly divided over whether all Arabs in the 
United States, including American citizens, should be required to carry special 
identity cards (Smith 2001). Two late September Gallup polls found that a major-
ity of Americans favored profiling of Arabs, including American citizens, and 
subjecting them. to special security checks before boarding planes.15 A Decem-
. . 
her 2001 University of Illinois poll found that some 70 percent of Illinois resi-
dents were willing to sacrifice their civil rights to fight terrorism, and more than 
one-quarter of respondents said Arab Americans should surrender more rights 
than others.1~ A March 2002 CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll found that nearly 60 
percent of Americans favored reducing the number of immigrants from Muslim 
countries. In August, a majority of the American public said that there were "too 
· many" immigrants from Arab countries.17 In December 2004, a Cornell Univer-
sity study .found that nearly 50 percent of respondents in a national poll believed 
the U.S. government should curtail civil liberties for Muslim Americans (Nisbet 
and Shanahan 2004). These polls indicate that the essentialized representations 
of Arabs and Muslims, propagated by the media and film industry, uncontested in 
pedagogy, and reflected in government policies and actions, have been extremely 
effective in garnering public support for treating Arabs and Musli~s as a special 
14. "Essentia lis t" refers to a belief in re al, true human essences, existing outside or impervi-
ous to social and his torical context. See Om i and W inant (1994), 71. 
15. Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 2, 2001. 
16. News Sun (Ill.), Dec. 20, 2001. 
17. Gallup News Service, Aug. 8, 2002. 
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group possessing fewer rights than others. These views would not have emerged 
suddenly after 9/11 had they not been cultivated prior to the attacks. Otherwise, 
the hijackers would have been seen in ways similar to Timothy McVeigh, theOkla-
homa City bomber, or to members of the Irish Republican Army-as extremists 
whose actions do not reflect on an entire race, religion, or civilizat_ion. 
ARABS AND RACE FROM T HE P E RSPE C TIVE 
OF ARAB M U SLIMS IN M ETROPOLITAN CHI C A G O 
Data from interviews conducted with Arab Muslims in metropolitan Chicago as 
part of a post-9/11 ethnographic study provide insight into how Arabs view their 
place in the racial structure of the United States. One hundred and two study 
participants (see table 2.1 for sample demography) were as~ed: "There have 
been discussions about whether Arabs are white or not, with different points 
of view. Do you think Arabs are white, not white, or what?" Sixty-three percent 
of respondents said Arabs were not white, 20 percent said they were white, and 
another 17 percent gave equivocal responses. Study data indicate the elements 
· of social life persons bring to bear on their assessment of the "racial place" of 
Arabs, which in theory could be phenotypical, experiential, observational, rela-
tional, local, national, or global. 
Individuals who said Arabs were not white made this assessment on the basis 
· (in order of frequency) of: their treatment in American society, skin color and 
other phenotypic criteria, the fact that Arabs are multiracial, cultural/historical 
differences from white Europeans, and Arab distinctiveness ("Arabs are Arabs"). 
Many invoked multiple criteria. A majority of persons who said Arabs are white 
and about one-third of persons who said Arabs were not white moved immedi-
ately into an unprovpked discourse about forms-especially census form·s and 
job and school applications. In other words, the discussion of race became a dis-
cussion of categories and boxes and their views on these boxes and on the way 
that American society groups people by color. Arabs know that they are supposed 
to check the "white" box on forms, and a majority say they do so, even if they have 
serious problems with the concept, and even if they believe Arabs are not white. 
Q: There have been discussions about whether Arabs are white or not, with 
different points of view. Do you think Arabs are white, not white, or what? 
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Table 2.1 
Cainkar Study: Arab/Muslim Sample Statistics 
Demographic Percentage 
Female 45 
Income 
Age 
Poor/low income 
Middle class 
Upper middle class and wealthy 
19-29 
30-49 
50 and over 
18 
62 
20 
30 
56 
14 
Education 
High school or less 
Some college or BS/BA 
Postgraduate 
Born in U.S.• 
N 
14 
43 
42 
29 
102 
•Includes for sociological reasons persons who migrated to the United States before age ten. 
A: This confuses me every time I fill out an application. We are not white, 
black, Hispanic, or Asian. We are Arab. I put white. If there is another, some-
times I put that. But I put White because I know we are not other. (Jordanian-
born f~male) 
Most interviewees made a distinction between what they write on forms 
and what they see as their reality. In other words, Arab American responses 
on forms are social constructions in themselves, and must be understood as 
the_ products of a larger social context. This man speaks about h~w he writes 
"white," meanwhile knowing it's not "true." 
We used to_ report quarterly on affirmative action and I always asked my boss · 
"what should .I do?" Should I put myself as a minority or not?" He did not 
know either, so we called the company headquarters and they said you will be 
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considered white. But of course in real life we are not. As far as statistics go, 
that's what they say, legally. (Palestinian-born male) 
Still, some insist on checking the "other" box. Most who do this do not know 
that persons who check "other" and can be determined to be Arab, or who write 
in "Arab," are recoded as white by the Census Bureau. 
I always choose other. I'm not white and I'm not going to check white. (Puerto 
Rican-born male) 
A large proportion of persons who said Arabs are white said they knew Ar-
abs were white because they were told that was the case. 
I was really surprised when I learned that we were Caucasian. (U.S.-born 
woman) 
Geographically, Egypt is in Africa but they classify all the Arabs as white, so I 
write white. (Egyptian-born male) 
· Many Arab Americans see being required to participate in a project that so-
cially constructs their identity in ways that match historic American ideas about 
race but denies their real _experiences and refuses them minority benefits as yet 
· another layer of discrimination. 
I am resentful that I have to put down white. I don't look white. I am not 
treated as white. ( !.~-generation female) 
I felt I was at a disadvantage to have to check "white." I don't think it's fair 
because it is not who I am. I just don't feel that I'm a typical white American, 
yo_u know, Anglo-Saxon, because if you look at me I'm not. I fed that I am a 
minority. Why should I be grouped with these people and not have a chance to 
obtain a scholarship? (Libyan-born female) 
Sometimes you put other but what is other? Other could be anything. You 
feel like inferior, you know. Like the minority of the minorities. We're not de-
fined .... Officially we are white but we're not white. Somebody can say I don't 
• 
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have to hire you because you are white and I have a lot of white people here. But 
you're not white! (Palestinian-born male) 
Placement in the "white" category effectively hides the discrimination that Arab 
Americans face by removing them as subjects in the study of social inequalities. 
If we were recognized as a minority it would be acknowledged that oppression 
and discrimination occur. Socially we are not accepted in white circles. (Chi-
cago-born female) 
ARABS ARE _NOT WHITE: RESPONSES BASED ON HOW 
ARABS ARE TREATED IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
The largest response category among ·persons who said Arabs are not white (36 
percent) revolved around how Arabs are treat~d in American society.18 In other 
words, they saw their racial place as nonwhite because they do not benefit from 
the statuses, assumptions, and rewards that accrue to whitene~s. These respon-
dents. note the political -exclusion and discriminatory treatment in schools and 
among the public that Arab Americans experience. The overwhelming majority 
of interviewees who gave this type of response were born in the United States, 
sugges_ting that deep understanding of the relationship between race and in-
equality of experience are particularly American, formed as part of an Ameri-
can upbringing. Their responses, in that they invoke issues that existed before 
9/11, support the thesis that the racial project excluding Arabs from the benefits 
of whiteness was in place long before 9 / 11. 
We have alw11ys been told we should be classified as other, then white. But if 
I go to Mississippi with my brother named Ahmed, there is no way he'd be 
treated as white. (Chicago-born female) 
· · Arabs are definitely not white. That categorization comes from the treatment of 
a community by the institutions of American society. Arabs in the schools face 
the same institutional racism as other students of color. (Chicago-born male) 
18. Because these are open-ended ethnographic interviews, some persons offered responses 
that fall into multiple categories. 
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The issue is, are you part of a privileged group of people that can dominate 
others, and I do not think we are part of that. Arabs are not part of the white or 
European ruling structure. We are politically excluded. (U.S.-born female) 
One interviewee sees Arabs claiming whiteness as a survival mechanism de-
veloped in an earlier era, but one that is no longer effective in today's cities and 
suburbs, where Arab Americans face dominant culture oppression. 
There is a great proportion who are going to say white because when the court 
allowed them [Arabs] to come into this country, one of the most racialized 
societies in the world where there is a white/black dichotomy, identifying with 
white was a way of surviving. But as kids grow up in urban areas and in the 
suburbs, I think they reject whiteness as oppression. Many are gravitating to-
ward the black experience and black culture as something closer to their ex-
perience. Young Arab kids growing up here definitely do not see themselves as 
white. (Jordanian-born mal~) 
Since 9/11, the racial Otherness of the Arabs has been reconstructed as the 
foreign enemy, leading many Arab Americans to fear for their long-term safety 
in the United States. 
You understand that t~ere is racism even if it is not personally inflicted on you. 
Being a first-generation Egyptian American and Muslim is a difficult thing- to 
form an identity of your own and feel like an American and that you fit into this 
country when you feel you really don't anyway. So, there's always been this sort 
of racism .... That outlook was always there, it was just exaggerated [ after 9/11) 
making you feel like the enemy. That you're the bad one, and you're definitely 
a foreigner and do not belong in this country. I'm just as much American as 
anyone else. I feel like maybe I need to- get the hell out of this country because 
something bad is going to happen to our people here. (U.S.-born female) 
ARABS ARE NOT WHIT E : RESPONSES BAS E D ON SKIN COLOR 
AND OTH E R PHENOTYPIC C RIT E RIA 
The second most common response (28 percent) among persons who said Arabs 
are not white was about skin color and other phenotypic features. Both U.S.-
and non-U.S.-born respondents made such statements, although immigrants 
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frequently spoke of how they learned about social systems organized around 
skin color only after arriving in the United States. 
You know it's funny, nobody ever discusses color once you step out•of the 
United States. I think it only matters in this country. This country is very race 
conscious, color conscious I mean. My sister married a very dark man and 
when you look at him you would say he is black. We never thought that was un-
usual. ... I complained about my hair once at school and they said oh, yeh, you 
have that Semitic hair. I never thought of my hair being Semitic. Sometimes 
the girls would say to me "well you are olive-skinned." I don't see myself that 
way. So, I think in their minds they have a perception of gradations of color, 
and I don't have that. (Jordanian-born female) 
If not white, what color are Arabs? Some respondents tried to place them-
selves on a color chart, citing olive, brown, gray, or black. 
I'm not white, I am olive. To certain people it matters if you're white. (Chicago-
born female) 
People look at me arid they don't know what I am. They know I am not white or 
black. People think I am Hispanic. Brown is in the middle. (U.S.-born female) 
Clinically; Arabs have dispersed around the world enough to fall into both cat-
egories. Clinically they are a people of color. I consider myself gray (between 
white and black). (Palestinian-born male) 
I am from a country that is not white, for sure. (Sudanese-born male) · 
Arab Americans who say Arabs are not phenotypically white also point out 
that more than skin color enters the equation; there are also distinguishing fa-
cial features and types of hair. 
We don't look white. What matters in the U.S. is not Caucasian blood but skin 
color. This has_ a huge impact on us. And you see nappy hair, even if blue eyes 
and light skin. (Chicago-born female) 
In this suburb, it is lily white. We don't belong here. I am very aware of my skin 
color and looks. (Kuwaiti-born female) 
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Many respondents were extremely uncomfortable with the very concept of 
race and color. After stating that Arabs were not white, some respondents ex-
plained that they found the very idea of race useless, irrelevant, or offensive and 
some observed that racism is abhorred in Islam . 
We are definitely not white. But the whole idea of color makes no sense to me. 
My neighbor is black according to census forms but she is lighter than I am. 
There are Arabs that are lighter than white people. I don't think people should 
be classified like that, by color. I don't agree with it at all. If I was to classify 
myself, I would consider myself brown. I would not consider myself white. My 
youngest and oldest child would be white and my middle child brow~. It does 
not work for me. (Kuwaiti-born female) 
You are not the color of your skin. It is ridiculous to try and categorize everybody 
into certain groups of skin color. You are who you are because of what sits in your 
heart and the experiences you ~ave encountered in your life. (U.S.-born male) 
I don't feel comfortable classifying people by color anyway. It is against my 
ideology, my thinking, and my religion. (Egyptian-born male) 
We do not talk about this issue in our community. We feel that we are Muslims 
and that is what matters to us. (Palestinian-born male) 
ARABS ARE NOT WHITE: THEY SPAN A RAN GE 
OF GEOG RAPHI C REGIONS AND SKIN COLORS 
The third most common response (24 percent) among persons who said Arabs 
are not white was that ·Arabs cannot be a racial group because the Arab world 
encompasses many geographic regions and skin colors. As such, it is not possible 
to assign a color to Arabs. 
I t_hink Arabs should have a different category until things change ... . If you 
look on the map, Arab countries cover two continents, and the white-white 
and dark black. If this is my cousin and he's dark, and he's from Africa, are you 
going to call him white? (U.S.-born female) 
It does not matter to me because in the Arab community we have white, black, 
and yellow. As Muslims, there is no difference between colors. (Palestinian-
born male) 
--
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Arabs are distinct upon themselves, and the Arab world encompasses both 
black and white. (U.S.-born female) 
Arabs are a race of colors, many colors. (Lebanese-born male) 
ARABS ARE NOT WHITE : ARAB HERITAGE IS DIFFERENT 
FROM CAUCASIAN/EUROPEAN 
The fourth most common response (20 percent) among persons who said Arabs 
are not white was about culture and heritage. To these Arab Americans, being 
white means being Caucasian and European, and Arabs are neither. 
I don't see myself as white. We have a different background. I think of Europe-
ans. We are more African than European. (Lebanese-born male) 
Most Arabs think Caucasians are Europeans.· (Kuwaiti-born male) 
For those wh_o said bei~g white means being European, then allowing your his-
tory to be subsumed into that of Europe means denying your own Arab culture 
and heritage. 
White in_my mind means European, but since I am not European, I feel like I 
am lying. Why should I write white? (Egyptian-born male) 
I have a culture and heritage; being white denies that. (U.S.-born female) 
Their history and culture is quite separate from Europe's. I find it a disgrace 
that the Arcib people should be so blatantly insulted by the disregard of their 
history. (U.S.-born female) 
The following comments from a young man living in a middle-class Chi-
cago suburb show how Arab is counterposed to Caucasian/white/American at 
the grounded neighborhood level: 
. . 
I was with a. group of friends. These Americans, Caucasians, drove past us 
and yelled out remarks-racial remarks. They turned around and they ran at 
us and we started to fight. In Chicago Ridge everyone was Arabic mostly, our 
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whole neighborhood was Arabic, so no white person or American would say 
something about us unless it was in school, but in Orland, it's a little different. 
Arabic are like, they are not the minorities over there. 
Q: Have women been affected in any special way? 
A: They've been affected because it's more hard for them to walk down the 
street especially if they are in more of a Caucasian neighborhood, people like 
to stare and talk like behind their backs and Arabic women might not like that 
but Arabic women can't say things back. Things like that. (Jordanian-born 
male who came to the United States at age one) 
Seventeen percent of respondents gave what may be called equivocal re-
sponses to the race question, marking the difficulty they have with the very 
idea of race and of pigeonholing Arabs into a racial category. The following 
quote expresses this ambiguity as it reveals (along with son:ie of the quotes 
above) the socially constructed nature of the way Arabs respond to the formu-
laic race question. 
I don't really know. I think, for me, it's always been white because of what I 
look like. I consider myself white. That's probably a personal reflection be-
cause my skin color is white. I've always thought all Arabs were white. I've 
never really thought of them as being nonwhite. But, again, why do we say 
we're white, because we're not white. Like people say, "you put 'white,"' and I 
think that it just doesn't make sense. I don't know what white means in terms 
of technical definition. Is it people who live north of the equator? I don't know 
how the experts have defined it. If you ask anybody, they say to put white as a 
race. Do I think we're white? I don't think so. (Chicago-born female) 
THE BOX. MATTERS IN A SOCIETY BUILT ON RA CE 
Even ~hough the race question was not formulated as a discussion of forms and 
categories, responses nearly always invoked them at some point, signaling both a 
learned relationship between racial identification and state categories and a deep 
tension between the Arab experience in the United States and the phenomenon 
of racial categorization, which may be ideological, religious, or experiential. 
Nonetheless, when asked whether racial identification matters, 30 percent of per-. 
sons interviewed said racial position is important in American society, whether 
they like the concept or not, because it is used to determine one's benefits. As 
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nc:;ither white nor nonwhite, Arabs accrue neither the benefits of whiteness nor 
the protections of minority affirmative action. They feel this exclusion is unfair 
and further indicates their subordinate status. While quite a few respondents 
said Arabs should have their own separate category, like Hispanics, since they do 
not fit into any existing categories, many think the whole discussion is absurd, 
except that American institutions work on these premises. 
Hmm. Does it matter? It might matter, actually, I'm not really sure. I guess if 
you're looking theoretical, it shouldn't matter, but when you look on social and 
political and all that stuff, I think it does matter because of the way institutions 
in our society run. If you have affirmative action at your university and you're 
African American, there are rights of having a qualified percentage. We prob-
ably_ wish it doesn't matter, but it does. On resume applications, they look at 
what your application says. I think it'would be foolish to think that they don't 
look at what your race is. (Chicago-born female) 
The formation of Arabs as a unique racial group (separate from white) was 
a racial project with timing and purpose different from historic American rac-
ism, leaving Arabs in the position of having no racial category (box) that makes 
sense to most of them. Arabs were in the midst of a new racial formation process 
that rendered them nonwhite after the categories of race-white, black, His-
panic, Asian and Pacific Islander, and Native American-had been set. While a 
new multiracial category has been developed, Arab American claims asking for 
_a special category have been declined by the Census Bureau. Although largely 
rejecting the concept of the racial box, Arabs know that in a racially constructed 
society, thinking inside the box matters. 
Arab Americans may have racial options that members of other groups do 
· not possess. Some may be able to decide from one moment or context to the next 
whether they are white or not, whether they will select the box as they have been 
to_ld or think about skin color, or contemplate how they are treated. Their racial 
identity may change over their lifetime, based on their own experiences, prefer-
ences, ahd demands. Racial ident~ty is an unfolding, ongoing, contextual, and so-
cially constructed process for Arab Americans. As the research d_ata· show, when 
Arab Americans_ select the "white" box, it does not necessarily mean that they 
identify with whiteness. But when they check "other," they become lost, a group 
that is paradoxically hidden yet the object of social obsession. These options do 
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not alter their grounded reality as a negatively stigmatized group; on the con-
trary, they offer proof of their racially subordinate status. 
Study data from metropolitan Chicago show that the majority of Arab Mus-
lims view their social position in American society as subordinate and translate 
that status to a nonwhite racial position in a race-based societal hierarchy . . Un-
fortunately, one cannot conclude from these data if religious affiliation plays 
any role in this outcome because Arab Christians were not part of the study. It is 
notable, however, that religion and religious discrimination were rarely invoked 
in responses to this question, except in statements that Islam does not condone 
racial distinctions. 
DISCRIMINATION AND SAFETY IN THE POST-9/11 
ARAB MUSLIM EXPERIENCE 
Prejudice, discrimination, and ,a compromised sense of safety are historically 
correlated with racial subordination in the United States. These experiences 
have ranged from lynching, mass removals, quarantining,_ law-enforcement 
:profiling, and sentencing disparities, to inferior employment, housing, and edu-
cational opportunities. Study participants were asked if they had experienced 
discrimination since 9/11; 53 percent said yes and 47 percent said no. Among 
those who responded "yes," specific instances of discrimination were reported 
.in the following social sectors: employment (39 percent), public space (22 per-
cent), schools (11 percent), law enforcem~nt (11 percent) , commercial transac-
tions (9 percent), government offices (9 percent), airports/airplanes (7 percent), 
and civil society institutions (6 percent). When one reads the interviews fully, 
however, one discovers that these resp.onses are related to a specific interpreta-
tion of the meaning of the term discrimination, which is to be denied something 
or treated in a different way than others. For example, many people did not 
interpret hate speech as discrimination. The same applies to feeling unsafe or 
fearing removal from the United States, which came up many times in the inter-
views, or having to change one's name to avoid prejudice. 
Q: Have you experienced what you would consider discrimination? 
A: No. I have not qone anything to trigger it. I have not flown on a plane 
or applied for a job, where someone could say I couldn't. I have done things 
to protect me. I got tired of these things. I served in the military. People 
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question your loyalty. I got veterans plates from the state. I thought it would 
make a difference if someone sees me, or the police, or going somewhere they 
would know there is such a thing as the Arab face and-serving in the military. 
(Palestinian-born male) 
Many respondents said they felt watched while conducting routine activities, 
such as loading their car trunks, but did not indicate that as discrimination. Oth-
ers changed their normal life patterns to avoid placing themselves in situations in 
which they expected to experience discrimination, by eating separately or chang-
ing jobs. Many persons who used to travel domestically changed their travel pat-
terns after the attacks; they either stopped traveling or drove to their destinations. 
These actions indicate that the policing and control of members of the group has 
moved inside the mind of the individual, what Hatem Bazian (2004) has called 
"virtual internment" and Nadine Naber (2006) has termed "internment of the 
psyche." In the following quotes, Arab Americans talk about changing their 
names and their friendship groups to avoid verbal harassment or abuse. 
No. The only problem I have is my name "Osama." When people ask me, I say 
Sam. (U.S.-born male) 
I changed my circle of friends from Caucasian small-town girls [at NIU] to 
Arabs an_d Muslims and people of other ethnic backgrounds. I stopped going 
to bars and clubs and anywhere people made ignorant comments. Caucasians 
lack tolerance. (U.S.-born female) 
I can_ feel too much discrimination in people's eyes when they gaze <?r stare 
at me after realizing I'm Arabian. Actually my appearance is kind of tricky. 
I'm very white, so at the first glance people would think I'm American or be-
long to some other nationality, therefore, they treat me nicely. But, when I tell 
· them I'm Arabian, their looks would change suddenly .... In the past, I gave 
my business card to customers to call me whenever they need a ride, but they 
never did. It is only after I changed my Arabian name to be American that I 
have started to receive many calls from my customers. (Palestinian-born male; 
taxi driver) 
The overwhelming majority of study interviewees reported being verbally 
harassed after 9/11, although the harassment took different forms depending 
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upon the context in which it occurred. Public spaces such as streets and shop-
ping malls were primary sites of abusive behavior, where Arabs were marked as 
foreigners to be spit at, sneezed upon, and sometimes threatened with worse. 
Once, we were in our car, and because my wife wore the veil, some people spit-
ted on us, swore and insulted us. Many times while walking down the street, we 
found ourselves subject to many·insults such as turning someone's face, spitting 
and using rude expressions that we didn't understand. (Palestinian-born male) 
One lady said to me "If I had a gun I would shoot you." (Palestinian-born 
female) 
We were driving and some teenagers shouted to us, "go back to your country. 
We need to get rid of you guys, kill you off." (Chicago-born female) 
The public schools emerged as another site of harassment after 9/11, but my 
research has consistently shown schools as sites of discrimination long before 
9/11. Here the pedagogical bias against Arabs and Muslims emerges; dominant 
:discourses that demonize them are located not only in the media; they are also 
taught in the schools. 
On 9/11 I was the only Arab in the class. We were watching TV and the teach-
er's way of dealing with ·me changed. He showed pictures of Osama bin Laden 
and said [pointing to the respondent], "Ask him if you have any questions." 
(Palestinian-born inale, community college student) 
On a personal level my family was not harassed but kidded around a lot in 
school. Like you are an Arab, and therefore you must go to prison now? Camel 
jockey go home and this sort of verbal h_arassment. As well as the teachers, one 
of the teachers at --school, right after 9/11 said something to the effect of 
the Muslims, their religion allows them to become terrorists. This is part of 
what they believe is jihad. Of course my son was extremely humiliated by such 
a statement and was not able to respond because it was a figure of, you know 
a teacher and educator. But he told me about it and I verified it from another 
Muslim student in the same class. Then I went to talk to the school. And then 
we started a whole series of workshops to educate educators about Islam and 
who are the Arabs and a basic 101. So that was on a personal level, it touched 
home. (Saudi-born female) 
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II) many schopl settings, discrimination against Arabs and Muslims has become 
institutionalized. This institutionalization appears to be particularly true in 
schools where Arabs and Muslims are a significant minority population and 
may be located in the statements and actions of administrators and secretaries, 
as well as in the lunch talk of teachers, forming a kind oflocal school culture. 
I remember specifically one of the administrators ... we were doing a reenact-
ment in case anything ever happened at the school like a terrorist attack. The 
public schools had to have some type of a plan and one of the administrators 
said, "Well, if a terrorist comes in, don't argue with that person about your 
religious ideology." Kind of insinuating there would be a Muslim as a terror-
ist. I kind of thought that was a bit of a discriminating remark, because you 
wouldn't have someone say . .. if you were contemplating that it was a racial 
issue, don't stand and discuss your · race with that person, insinuating there 
would be a black American. So, I was a bit offended by that. So, remarks like 
that, I think, are, you know, I would define a·s discrimination. (U.S.-born fe-
male; teacher) 
The day after 9/11 I was in the lunchroom and one of my colleagues said he saw 
a woman at the grocery store "with that thing on her head" and he wanted to 
hit her. Another colleague said "that would be stupid, they did not do it," and 
another colleague said "how do you know that, those people who did it were 
living hel'e." I got up and left. I did not say anything. I was angry, and at the 
same time angry at myself for not having guts. After that, I was confiding in 
one of my friends what I felt and she said "if someone like you was next me on 
an airplane, I'd get nervous. (Egyptian-born 1.5 female; teacher) 
I feel I'm discriminated against while at my children's school. The secretary there 
deals differently with Arabs. She never greets Arabic parents or smiles at them, 
while she always acts normally with other parents. (Kuwaiti-born female) 
Many interviewees reported discrimination in the context of commercial 
transactions, especially in businesses located in primarily white suburban areas. 
Shopping-people give an attitude, a look everywhere. Once J· was with a 
friend at Kohls. I bought a lot of stuff. Expensive. The lady said after I paid 
for everything, she wants to check my stuff. She thought I stole. It was so em-
barrassing. I said bring your supervisor. She thought I'm afraid, that I don't 
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speak the language. She started screaming at me. She called the supervisor. She · 
checked. Everything was right. Asked cashier to apologize and she would not. I 
feel pressure is too high. She really embarrassed me. (Jordanian-born female) 
I was at Linens and Things in Naperville with my friend and my curtain rod 
was hanging over the cart. I turned to the guy behind me to apologize for my · 
rod (it did not touch him). I apologized and he said "turn around and don't talk 
to me." I said "someone woke up on the wrong side of the bed." He said "It's 
none of your business what side of the bed I woke up on. Why don't you wake up 
and go back where you came from." I was just floored. (Kuwaiti born female) 
In addition to discrimination in public spaces and schools, some interview-
ees reported attacks on their homes. 
Well, my van in front of my house was covered with eggs several times, about 
one or two months ago. I didn't report it ... also some garbage was put in 
our mailbox, like ice cream cones and wrappers, stuff like that . . .. Once we 
called the police because it wasn't just the cars but also the house! They pelted 
the door with eggs, so I called the Oak Lawn police and he came and looked 
around. I showed him above the door and the van, and I wasn't happy with it 
and he said "Well, maybe these are kids" and I said, "Yeah, I know they aren't 
adults but they did it on purpose, not just because they were just having fun 
because it's only my house and my car." On the street, there are so many cars 
parked but only my cars were the ones hit. He said, "I recommend that you 
have a garage," and I said, "Yes, I do." He said I should put the cars in the 
garage and I asked him "Officer, what should I do with rriy door? Put it in the 
garage too?" (Palestinian-born male) 
Discrimination was also reported in_ the ~ontext of work and applying for 
jobs. In the job application process, sometimes names triggered discrimination, 
other times it was triggered by looks. 
Actually I face it personally like when I go fill out applications or go fill out pa-
pers because of my Arabic name-when you hear my name you know I am 100 
percent Arabic of Arabic descent. When I write my name-it's like-I don't 
know like if they saw my name and some kid named "Mike" they're going 
to pick the "Mike" kid instead of me. Well I don't know for sure but I know 
where I went to a place that has llO percent hiring and t_here was two kids with 
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ine-one of them Arabic and one of them white-and all three of us filled out 
the application and the white kid got the job. (Jordanian-born male, migrated 
at age one) 
Besides the physical and verbal abuse, I applied for a job and I feel that it's 
not just that I'm imagining it. They said, "We don't know if we want someone 
who covers." Obviously, this is illegal but this was when I was going to school 
and I was trying to get a job in retail. For example, "It's not part of the image 
we want to have, especially now being a negative connotation and with you 
covering and the whole post-9/11 thing." In that regard, I have absolutely been 
discriminated against. But I always have. That just goes with being covered-I 
was always discriminated against pre-9/11 but especially post-9/11. I went to 
talk to the corporate manager of that retail chain and said it was uncalled for. 
They basically apologized and offer~d me a job but I didn't want to work there 
because of the bad experience I had and because I would probably be working 
with other people who probably felt the same way. Someone who's not working 
in the shop but at the headquarters is different. Originally, I did talk to a law-
yer and they were going to go into it but I didn't go further than that. (Libyan-
born female," migrated before age ten) 
Discussions about Arab or Muslim terrorists were encountered by some in-
terviewees in the daily context of work. 
I have heard we should kill all Arabs/Muslims from people at work. (Egyptian-
born male, migrated at age one) 
Here in Chicago I would say not blatant, but right after 9/11 I took a job with 
a huge insu~ance brokerage firm and I was an underwriter for them and I ba-
sically assessed their risk for specific types of insurance coverage. And I had 
to deal a lot with the terrorism act that was made mandatory by Bush for all 
insurance P?licies. So when we were meeting about this and I was having to 
underwrite coverages and implement the terrorist act in there, there was ... I 
dealt with a lot of bullshit comments and meetings from a lot of white people 
that were like_ you know how do we underwrite if .. . how are we supposed to 
underwrite if Ahmed or Mohammad get crazy and decide to throw another 
plane into a . building and I am just like . . . I am sitting in this room and I 
am trying to maintain my composure and my managing director looks at me, 
she and I had a pretty good relationship, she was kind of like my mentor, she 
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knows that I am just like brewing and steaming and she's like well first of all 
we shouldn't assume that it's going to be an Ahmed or a Mohammad you know 
and I quickly interjected, it could be a Timothy McVeigh, you.know but either 
way you've got to underwrite it, figure out how to underwrite the risk that's 
involved. And everybody just kind of looked at me and I was just like it's the 
truth. (U.S.-born female) 
One interviewee noted that discriminatory sentiments existed well before 9/11 
and that they were more openly expressed in less diverse work environments: 
I had more problems in my work after the Oklahoma City bombing th_an Sep-
tember 11. The Oklahoma City bombing wasn't Arab. I used to work in Ohio 
and I remember what happened in Oklahoma City, and it happened about 
noontime and I came back to the office and the guards who worked with me, 
they were joking and they asked me "where you been? You been to Oklahoma?" 
They told me what happened and they kind of put the finger on me like you 
guys did it, you know. I didn't feel comfortable; but the next day, when they 
found out who did it, things changed. I was working with another company 
two years after that, there was a guy who joked with me, I don't know if he was 
serious or if he was joking, he said, "if you want to bring a bomb here, just let 
me know, I'll leave the building before you come." I told him, "Listen, this is 
not a joke. Don't joke with me like that." This happened way after Oklahoma 
City and before September 11. I think the difference is the kind of people I 
work here with is different. In Ohio, there's not international or foreign people 
a lot. Most of the companies I worked with, I was the onJy one who had an ac-
cent. I'm the only one who's not white, you know. I look different and I have 
an accent and so on. Here in Chicago it 's different .. . different nationalities, 
different languages .. A lot of people have accents and people here, Americans 
and others, are used to that a lot. I feel more comfortable working in Chicago. 
(Palestinian-born male) 
LACK OF SAFETY 
Similarly, despite the fact that many interviewees said they had not experienced 
discrimination, a majority said that there are places where they do not feel safe 
in American society. A seqse oflack of safety in public spaces appears to be gen- · 
dered, as women, especially muhajibaat (women wearing headscarves) express 
this feeling significantly more than men. A large number of women interviewed, 
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m-uhajibaat or not, report feeling afraid for their safety in certain types of public 
places. These places are almost always connected to whiteness. That is, while 
some men and women said they feel unsafe as individuals in neighborhoods 
associated with crim.inal activity, those who felt unsafe as Arabs or Muslims felt 
that way only in all-white or dominantly white areas. One woman said, "You 
won't find me in a park or a forest preserve"; another said, "Soccer moms scare 
me the most." Suburban shopping centers and malls were mentioned frequently 
as places where women endured stares and insults. The purpose of being made 
to feel uneasy, as they see it, is that Arabs and Muslims understand that they will 
not be granted the same rights and privileges that accrue to members of white 
society, including the privilege of being treated as an individual. Individuality 
lies at the opposite end of the pole to collective responsibility. The marking of 
these differences did not emerge as a result of the 9/11 attacks; the process was 
set in motion long before; creating the conditions for the attribution of collec-
tive guilt for the attacks. 
Feeling unsafe is not limited to the public sphere. Interrogations, arrests, 
home invasions,. and computer and property confiscations enacted by federal 
government authoriti,es appear random, unfocused, and discriminatory to 
members of Arab and Muslim American communities. The government's use 
of secret evidence, closed hearings, arrests on terrorism charges that cannot be 
subst~ntiated_, eavesdropping on attorneys, and special registration have not 
built community confidence that Arab Americans will be treated fairly by the 
government or that the government's target is limited to terrorists and people 
who support them. Consequently, nearly everyone in the community feels vul-
nerable to. a certain degree, even in their own homes. Thus, while some persons 
in the study said they felt safest in their homes, others said they felt the hidden 
eyes of surveillance, assumed their phones were tapped and computers moni-
tored, and were concerned about the right of government agents to enter their 
home·s at any time without permission or without leaving a trace. 
·. . Such matters of safety and security, where one is not safe even in one's home, 
are historically tied to racial subordination in American society: Native Ameri-
cans lost their land and were placed in camps; African Americans were sold as 
property and segregated; Latinos were expropriated, attacked, and expelled in 
waves; and Asians were relegated to urban ghettos, denied property rights, and, 
in the case of Japanese, interred. The circle of closure that Arabs and Muslims 
feel is often not physically tangible, but many fear it could become so if another 
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attack occurs. A majority of persons interviewed for this study said that they no 
longer feel secure in the United States and many fear a mass deportation, revo-
cation of citizenship, or internment camps. Those with resources have adopted 
strategies to anticipate these potential outcomes: they have sent their children 
to universities in other countries and begun building homes in their countries 
of origin. 
This feeling of "homeland insecurity" is exacerbated by the post-9/11 in-
crease in discourses about civilizational differences between Arabs and Muslims 
and people with Western values. These ideas are published and broadcast in the 
mainstream American media and used as justifications for a range of govern-
ment actions by neoconservative and Christian-right spokespersons, some of 
whom have described Islam as a religion outside the pale of human values and 
Muslims as "worse than Nazis" (Lee 2002). A booklet entitled Why Islam Is a 
Threat to America and the West (Lind and Weyrich 2002) arguc;:s that Muslims 
are a fifth column in the United States and "should be encouraged to leave." 
Televangelist Pat Robertson called Muslims potential killers on his 700 Club TV 
program (Nimer 2003). Franklin Graham, who has called Islam an "evil and 
wicked religion," delivered the 2002 Good Friday homily at the-Pentagon (Helal 
aI1d Iftikhar 2003). While he was still in office, former attorney general Ashcroft 
stated in an interview with syndicated columnist Cal Thomas that "Islam is a 
religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for him. Christianity . 
is a faith in which God sends his son to die for you."19 Indeed, Arab and Muslim 
Americans feel quite uneasy·about the close alliance between the Bush adminis-
tration and the anti-Muslim Christian right.in a country that espouses equality 
and religious pluralism. 
CONCLUS ION 
The racialization processes experienced by"Arab Americans differ in both his-
torical tirp.ing and pretext from that of other groups in the United States. Un-
like the historical argument of racial superiority and inferiority used to buttress 
the d~velopment of the United States as a country of white privilege, the fall of 
Arabs from the graces of marginal whiteness is traceable to the later emergence 
19. See Mohamed Nimer (2003) and the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 
(2003) for more documentation of these types of comments. 
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of the United States as a global superpower. The seemingly race-neutral lens 
of essentialized cultural differences and innate violence was promoted in the 
media and left to percolate by the educational system, thereby building sup-
port for government policies that targeted Arab Americans and justified their 
political exclusion. The cultural barbarism approach was effective and powerful 
because by the time it was needed to buttress U.S. foreign policies, blata_nt rac-
ism was no longer an effective hegemonic tool in the United States. The racial 
project that moved Arabs into subordinate status began clearly to mark the Arab 
American experience in the late 1960s and was the rationale behind the foun-
dation of the most important pan-Arab American organizations. In the 1990s, 
when Islamist challenges to American global hegemony became more powerful 
than Arab nationalism, these essentialized constructions were extended to Mus-
lims and became grander; they became civilizational. Both Arabs and Muslims 
were represented as persons of inherently different values and dispositions from 
''Americans." In time, American foreign policy ambitions also became grander, 
. . 
purporting to bring freedom to the subjects of Muslim civilization. 
Race is something Americans know and understand and newcomers quickly 
learn: Despite all the efforts of the civil rights movement and affirmative action, 
race still has tremendous significance in American society. Like others in the 
United States, Arabs learn what their official racial group is. But many find a dis-
juncture between their assigned category (white) and their experiences, because 
race is· understood as a phenomenon with experiential correlates. For decades, 
Arab Americans have faced challenges from the public over their beliefs, values, 
opinions, and culture, and over their claims that they were being disenfran-
chised in the pursuit of American foreign policies. Challenges have been based 
largely on• notions that Arab American claims are invalid because the people 
making them are constitutionally different, flawed, less civilized, and more vio-
. lent than others. The widespread display of this message, attesting to the notion 
of inherent differences among humans and representing Arabs as other than 
civilized people,. has been an object of Arab American protest for more than 
thirty years. These representations of Arabs are embodied, displayed in images 
of dark haired, olive-skinned, hook-nosed, head-covered caricatures. Well in 
place before the 9/11 attacks, this corporealization came to life_ when "Ar;ibs, 
Muslims, and persons assumed to be Arabs and Muslims" were physically at-
tacked after 9/11. Notions of collective, civilizational responsibility justified 
imputing Arabs and Muslims with collective guilt for the attacks. As persons 
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purportedly of a different civilization, the Arab/Muslim became counterposed 
to the American and to the white-Arab and Muslim Americans became the 
suspected, unsafe, and virtually circled. 
The social and political exclusion of Arabs in the United States is an ob-
jectively verifiable racial project with global · goals. Arab inferiority has been 
constructed and sold to the American public using essentialist constructions 
of human difference in order to manufacture public consent for global poli-
cies. The most noted features of Arabs' exclusion have been persistent negative 
media representations, denial of political voice, governmental and nongovern-
mental policies that target their activism, and civilizational disto tions of Arab 
and Muslim values, ways of life, and homelands. Since the darkeni!lg of Arabs 
began in earnest after the beneficiaries of the U.S. civil rights movement had 
been determined and the categories of "nonwhite" and "minority" had been 
set, Arabs have experienced the double burden of being excluded from white-
ness and from mainstream recognition as people of <::olor. Their isolation from 
mainstream vehicles of dissent left them with few powerful allies to contest their 
treatment in American society, leaving them open targets for collective punish-
ment after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. While many A_rab American ac-
tivists recognized long ago that their road to political inclusion and curtailment 
of discrimination is in alliance with people of color, their "untouchable" for-
eign policy issues and domestic economic relationships at the local level placed 
strains on these relationships. Perhaps one of the positive developments in the 
post-9/11 United States is the greater willingness of these groups to accept Arab 
Americans into their ranks. 
